ON CERTAIN MOTOR COACHES EQUIPPED WITH A SLIDE SWITCH TO CONTROL THE DEFROSTER BLOWER SPEED, THERE IS A SPEED CONTROLLER FOR EACH OF THE TWO DEFROSTER FAN MOTORS. THE SPEED CONTROLLER MAY FAIL CAUSING THE FAN MOTOR TO OPERATE CONTINUOUSLY IN THE "HIGH" SPEED MODE, AND THE CARRIER SLIDE SWITCH MAY FAIL TO REDUCE OR OTHERWISE CONTROL THE FAN MOTOR SPEED.
Consequence & remedy
Consequence: THE SPEED CONTROLLER MAY OVERHEAT AND RESULT IN A THERMAL EVEN, SUCH AS SMOKING OR POSSIBLE FIRE.
Remedy: DEALERS WILL REPLACE THE DEFROSTER SPEED CONTROLLER FREE OF CHARGE. THE RECALL BEGAN ON JULY 20, 2006. OWNERS MAY CONTACT MOTOR COACH AT 1-800-241-2947.
ON CERTAIN MOTOR COACHES EQUIPPED WITH DETROIT DIESEL SERIES 60 ENGINES, THE TURBOCHARGER COMPRESSORS CAN FAIL.
Consequence & remedy
Consequence: A FIRE CAN RESULT SHOULD THE TURBOCHARGER FAIL.
Remedy: DETROIT DIESEL IS CONDUCTING THIS RECALL (PLEASE SEE 06E019000) AND WILL REMEDY THESE MOTOR COACHES. THE ENGINES WILL BE REPAIRED FREE OF CHARGE. OWNERS MAY CONTACT DETROIT DIESEL AT 313-592-3708 OR MOTOR COACH AT 866-624-2622.
Model-level recall history does not show whether a particular VIN is affected or has received a repair. Check a VIN with NHTSA ↗
NHTSA investigations
4
EA12007 · Mci Drive Shaft Safety Loop Failures
Opened Sep 13, 2012 · Closed Dec 3, 2015
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Power Train:driveline; Suspension:multiple Axle; SUSPENSION:REAR:AXLE:NON-POWERED Axle Assembly
In the fall of 2011, network contacts made ODI aware of four (4) incidents of drive shaft failure on the subject buses involving a loss of vehicle control.Two of the incidents were relatively low speed non-crash events; and two resulted in motor coach rollovers.All four events showed signs of a common failure mode.The incidents and crashes studied during this investigation all resulted from a series of complex events that began with the the yoke journal ears on the drive shafts fracturing.Once the drive shaft failed. it was not adequately contained by a drive shaft safety loop or structure.The spinning and unrestrained drive shaft caused severe damage to components on the steerable tag axle at the rear of the vehicle and created a forced steering condition.Once the rear of the bus was being forcibly steered by the tag axle, the driver lost control of the vehicle.These conclusions are based on the forensics evidence and testing conducted by the Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC).The VRTC test report is attached to this closing resume that provides details on how the test center was able to conclusively identify the defective components on the buses and demonstrate the sequence of events that caused the buses to crash.Prior to the drive shaft failure events, there were no indications of improper maintenance or that maintenance was required that would have prevented the incidents.Additionally, the U-joints on the incident vehicles were found to be in good working condition at the time of the failure. Finally, records of driver interviews indicated a sudden onset of the failure with no warning.Following the VRTC testing, MCI issued recall 14V-335 involving certain model year 1993-1995 102DL3 motor coaches manufactured November 1992 to January 1995, and 2006 and 2008 D4505 motor coaches manufactured June 2005 to April 2008.The affected buses are equipped with a drive shaft with a compressed length of 30 inches or less (allowing it to escape containment if it fails), a steerable trailing tag axle equipped with a system that changes the axle caster when the vehicle is in reverse travel and no electronic stability control (ESC).Recall 14V-335 addresses the concerns of this investigation.The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
Additional source detail variants (3)
Power Train:driveline
In the fall of 2011, network contacts made ODI aware of four (4) incidents of drive shaft failure on the subject buses involving a loss of vehicle control.Two of the incidents were relatively low speed non-crash events; and two resulted in motor coach rollovers.All four events showed signs of a common failure mode.The incidents and crashes studied during this investigation all resulted from a series of complex events that began with the the yoke journal ears on the drive shafts fracturing.Once the drive shaft failed. it was not adequately contained by a drive shaft safety loop or structure.The spinning and unrestrained drive shaft caused severe damage to components on the steerable tag axle at the rear of the vehicle and created a forced steering condition.Once the rear of the bus was being forcibly steered by the tag axle, the driver lost control of the vehicle.These conclusions are based on the forensics evidence and testing conducted by the Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC).The VRTC test report is attached to this closing resume that provides details on how the test center was able to conclusively identify the defective components on the buses and demonstrate the sequence of events that caused the buses to crash.Prior to the drive shaft failure events, there were no indications of improper maintenance or that maintenance was required that would have prevented the incidents.Additionally, the U-joints on the incident vehicles were found to be in good working condition at the time of the failure. Finally, records of driver interviews indicated a sudden onset of the failure with no warning.Following the VRTC testing, MCI issued recall 14V-335 involving certain model year 1993-1995 102DL3 motor coaches manufactured November 1992 to January 1995, and 2006 and 2008 D4505 motor coaches manufactured June 2005 to April 2008.The affected buses are equipped with a drive shaft with a compressed length of 30 inches or less (allowing it to escape containment if it fails), a steerable trailing tag axle equipped with a system that changes the axle caster when the vehicle is in reverse travel and no electronic stability control (ESC).Recall 14V-335 addresses the concerns of this investigation.The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
Suspension:multiple Axle
In the fall of 2011, network contacts made ODI aware of four (4) incidents of drive shaft failure on the subject buses involving a loss of vehicle control.Two of the incidents were relatively low speed non-crash events; and two resulted in motor coach rollovers.All four events showed signs of a common failure mode.The incidents and crashes studied during this investigation all resulted from a series of complex events that began with the the yoke journal ears on the drive shafts fracturing.Once the drive shaft failed. it was not adequately contained by a drive shaft safety loop or structure.The spinning and unrestrained drive shaft caused severe damage to components on the steerable tag axle at the rear of the vehicle and created a forced steering condition.Once the rear of the bus was being forcibly steered by the tag axle, the driver lost control of the vehicle.These conclusions are based on the forensics evidence and testing conducted by the Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC).The VRTC test report is attached to this closing resume that provides details on how the test center was able to conclusively identify the defective components on the buses and demonstrate the sequence of events that caused the buses to crash.Prior to the drive shaft failure events, there were no indications of improper maintenance or that maintenance was required that would have prevented the incidents.Additionally, the U-joints on the incident vehicles were found to be in good working condition at the time of the failure. Finally, records of driver interviews indicated a sudden onset of the failure with no warning.Following the VRTC testing, MCI issued recall 14V-335 involving certain model year 1993-1995 102DL3 motor coaches manufactured November 1992 to January 1995, and 2006 and 2008 D4505 motor coaches manufactured June 2005 to April 2008.The affected buses are equipped with a drive shaft with a compressed length of 30 inches or less (allowing it to escape containment if it fails), a steerable trailing tag axle equipped with a system that changes the axle caster when the vehicle is in reverse travel and no electronic stability control (ESC).Recall 14V-335 addresses the concerns of this investigation.The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
SUSPENSION:REAR:AXLE:NON-POWERED Axle Assembly
In the fall of 2011, network contacts made ODI aware of four (4) incidents of drive shaft failure on the subject buses involving a loss of vehicle control.Two of the incidents were relatively low speed non-crash events; and two resulted in motor coach rollovers.All four events showed signs of a common failure mode.The incidents and crashes studied during this investigation all resulted from a series of complex events that began with the the yoke journal ears on the drive shafts fracturing.Once the drive shaft failed. it was not adequately contained by a drive shaft safety loop or structure.The spinning and unrestrained drive shaft caused severe damage to components on the steerable tag axle at the rear of the vehicle and created a forced steering condition.Once the rear of the bus was being forcibly steered by the tag axle, the driver lost control of the vehicle.These conclusions are based on the forensics evidence and testing conducted by the Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC).The VRTC test report is attached to this closing resume that provides details on how the test center was able to conclusively identify the defective components on the buses and demonstrate the sequence of events that caused the buses to crash.Prior to the drive shaft failure events, there were no indications of improper maintenance or that maintenance was required that would have prevented the incidents.Additionally, the U-joints on the incident vehicles were found to be in good working condition at the time of the failure. Finally, records of driver interviews indicated a sudden onset of the failure with no warning.Following the VRTC testing, MCI issued recall 14V-335 involving certain model year 1993-1995 102DL3 motor coaches manufactured November 1992 to January 1995, and 2006 and 2008 D4505 motor coaches manufactured June 2005 to April 2008.The affected buses are equipped with a drive shaft with a compressed length of 30 inches or less (allowing it to escape containment if it fails), a steerable trailing tag axle equipped with a system that changes the axle caster when the vehicle is in reverse travel and no electronic stability control (ESC).Recall 14V-335 addresses the concerns of this investigation.The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
PE12007 · Mci Driveshaft Safety Loop Failures
Opened Mar 21, 2012 · Closed Sep 20, 2012
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Power Train:driveline; Suspension:multiple Axle; SUSPENSION:REAR:AXLE:NON-POWERED Axle Assembly
ODI has identified certain MCI coaches with powertrain configurations that may allow a driveshaft separated at the rearward universal joint to escape the guardian structure of the steerable tag axle and damage steering and braking components.The damaged components may increase the risk of a loss of vehicle control. The subject coaches include 806 model year 1992 through 2012 MCI D and E series motor coaches with steerable tag axles.This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA12-007) to further study the alleged defect and to determine if a safety defect exists. The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
Additional source detail variants (3)
Power Train:driveline
ODI has identified certain MCI coaches with powertrain configurations that may allow a driveshaft separated at the rearward universal joint to escape the guardian structure of the steerable tag axle and damage steering and braking components.The damaged components may increase the risk of a loss of vehicle control. The subject coaches include 806 model year 1992 through 2012 MCI D and E series motor coaches with steerable tag axles.This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA12-007) to further study the alleged defect and to determine if a safety defect exists. The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
Suspension:multiple Axle
ODI has identified certain MCI coaches with powertrain configurations that may allow a driveshaft separated at the rearward universal joint to escape the guardian structure of the steerable tag axle and damage steering and braking components.The damaged components may increase the risk of a loss of vehicle control. The subject coaches include 806 model year 1992 through 2012 MCI D and E series motor coaches with steerable tag axles.This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA12-007) to further study the alleged defect and to determine if a safety defect exists. The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
SUSPENSION:REAR:AXLE:NON-POWERED Axle Assembly
ODI has identified certain MCI coaches with powertrain configurations that may allow a driveshaft separated at the rearward universal joint to escape the guardian structure of the steerable tag axle and damage steering and braking components.The damaged components may increase the risk of a loss of vehicle control. The subject coaches include 806 model year 1992 through 2012 MCI D and E series motor coaches with steerable tag axles.This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA12-007) to further study the alleged defect and to determine if a safety defect exists. The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.
PE10001 · Wheel Chair Lift Separates From Bus
Opened Jan 14, 2010 · Closed Apr 9, 2010
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Structure:body:door
ODI opened this investigation upon learning of two incidents where the wheel chair assembly broke through the side door while the motor coach was being operated. Both incidents resulted in property damage to parked vehicles.After further review, MCI decided to conduct a safety recall to resolve this issue. MCI will provide parts and labor to install a Ricon-designed retrofit kit that includes a spring-loaded lock mechanism. The additional lock mechanism will prevent unintended wheel chair lift deployment regardless of the cause. The population includes 1995 through 2009 D4000's, 1997 through 2010 D4500's, and 2005 through 2010 D4505 models. This resolves all issues concerning this investigation. This investigation is closed.
PE09043 · Starter Cable Chafing
Opened Sep 9, 2009 · Closed Jan 13, 2010
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:wiring
IN AUGUST 2009, MOTOR COACH INDUSTRIES (MCI) SUBMITTED A SERVICE BULLETIN/PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT NOTICEDISCUSSING D-SERIES COACHES WITH PRE-2007 DETROIT S60 ENGINES IN WHICH THE STARTER CABLE MAY CHAFE AGAINST ENGINE BRACKETS AND/OR MOVEMENT WITHIN THE CABLE CLAMPS.THE STIPULATED CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO REPLACE THE CABLE AND INSTALL ADDITIONAL CLAMPS.ODI PLACES A HIGH PRIORITY ON POTENTIAL THERMAL EVENTS FOR ANY REASON IN MOTOR COACHES. THEREFORE, AN INVESTIGATION WAS OPENED.WITH THE ADVENT OF THE EPA 2007 ENGINE DESIGN,MCI IMPROVED THE STARTER CABLE ASSEMBLY.MCI CHANGED TO A HIGHER LOAD FLEX CABLE TO REDUCE THE LOADING BOTH INTO THE STARTER CABLE TERMINAL AND THE CLAMPING.FOR COACHES WITH 2006 (PRE-2007 DETROIT S60) AND EARLIER ENGINE COMBINATIONS, MCI BECAME AWARE OF A FEW REPORTS INVOLVING CABLE CHAFING FROM FLEETS USING AFTERMARKET CLAMPS.MCI SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO RELEASE A NEW INSTALLATION DESIGN FOR AFTER MARKET SERVICE ON THE PRE-2007 ENGINE. IN LIGHT OF OUR CONCERNS, MCI HAS DECIDED TO SEND OUT A NEW SERVICE BULLETIN MAKING OWNERS AWARE THAT THERE ARE SPECIFIC CLAMPS FOR USE ON THE STARTER CABLES AND INCORRECT AFTERMARKET CLAMPS SHOULD NOT BE USED. A COPY OF THE TSB WILL BE ATTACHED TO THIS RESUME UPON RECEIPT.BASED ON MCI'S DATA, ODI FIELD INSPECTIONS AND FURTHER REVIEW OF THIS ISSUE, A SAFETY RELATED DEFECT TREND DOES NOT EXIST AT THIS TIME AND FURTHER USE OF THE AGENCY RESOURCES ARE NOT CURRENTLY WARRANTED. THE CLOSING OF THIS INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINDING BY NHTSA THAT NO SAFETY-RELATED DEFECT EXISTS. THE AGENCY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION ON THE VEHICLES IF WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.ODI WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR FIELD REPORTSAND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IF INDICATED.
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