IllustrationTHE LEATHER IN THE MIDDLE CONSOLE AND THE LEFT ARM REST ARE PULLED BACK FOR JUST RESTING THE ARM THERE.
2013 Honda Civic
Owner reports · Recalls · Investigations
Similar to other model years
Owner complaints for the 2013 Honda Civic do not stand out strongly from the model-year median of 183.5.
About this comparison →How this year compares
Owner complaints by model year
Compare all Civic years →Counts vary with age, sales and reporting. They are not failure rates.
What owners reported most
All reported categories
Tap a category to read its complaints. One report may name several components.
When problems were reported
Mileage at the reported incident
980–25K
3525–50K
2850–75K
2075–100K
9100–150K
3150K+
193 reports with mileage · 126 unknown
NHTSA’s mileage field refers to the reported incident, not necessarily the filing date. This shows report counts, not the likelihood of a failure.
What to inspect
Issues worth paying extra attention to based on owner reports.
- Air Bags. Review the 114 owner reports in this category and discuss these concerns during a pre-purchase inspection. Read reports →
- Electrical System. Review the 39 owner reports in this category and discuss these concerns during a pre-purchase inspection. Read reports →
- Steering. Review the 38 owner reports in this category and discuss these concerns during a pre-purchase inspection. Read reports →
NHTSA owner reports · September 18, 2026 snapshot.
29 crash reports1 fire reports24 injury reports
Seats complaints
16 reportsTHE HONDA HEAD RESTRAIN IS UNCOMFORTABLE AND CAUSING A DISC BULGE IN MY NECK AT C-5/C-6. BASICALLY, THE HEAD RESTRAINT IS SUPPOSED TO PROTECT THE HEAD FROM INJURY IN A READ-END COLLISION, HOWEVER I HAVE BEEN INJURED JUST BY SITTING IN THE SEAT. HONDA DOES NOT PROVIDE REPLACEMENT HEAD RESTRAIN OR ADJUSTABLE HEAD RESTRAINT, WHICH …
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THE HONDA HEAD RESTRAIN IS UNCOMFORTABLE AND CAUSING A DISC BULGE IN MY NECK AT C-5/C-6. BASICALLY, THE HEAD RESTRAINT IS SUPPOSED TO PROTECT THE HEAD FROM INJURY IN A READ-END COLLISION, HOWEVER I HAVE BEEN INJURED JUST BY SITTING IN THE SEAT. HONDA DOES NOT PROVIDE REPLACEMENT HEAD RESTRAIN OR ADJUSTABLE HEAD RESTRAINT, WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE DRIVER THE OPTION TO HAVE A VERTICAL INSTEAD OF FORWARD TILTED HEAD RESTRAINT/HEAD REST.
HEAD RESTRAINTS ARE EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE AND CAUSE BACK AND NECK PAIN. NO WAY TO ADJUST THE SEAT OF RESTRAINTS ENOUGH TO ALLEVIATE THE DISCOMFORT.
DRIVER'S SEAT IS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE. AFTER DRIVING ONLY A FEW MILES MY BACK AND LEGS BEGIN TO ACHE BECAUSE OF THE POOR SEAT CUSHION DESIGN, THE CONCAVE SEAT BACK WITHOUT ANY LUMBAR SUPPORT, AND THE FORWARD LEANING HEAD RESTRAINT THAT KEEPS ME FROM STRAIGHTENING MY BACK WHILE STILL MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE SEAT BACK. I'M TE…
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DRIVER'S SEAT IS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE. AFTER DRIVING ONLY A FEW MILES MY BACK AND LEGS BEGIN TO ACHE BECAUSE OF THE POOR SEAT CUSHION DESIGN, THE CONCAVE SEAT BACK WITHOUT ANY LUMBAR SUPPORT, AND THE FORWARD LEANING HEAD RESTRAINT THAT KEEPS ME FROM STRAIGHTENING MY BACK WHILE STILL MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE SEAT BACK. I'M TEMPTED TO REMOVE THE HEAD RESTRAINT TO REDUCE THE PAIN SOMEWHAT. NO MANUFACTURER OR DEALERSHIP REPAIRS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BECAUSE HONDA APPARENTLY DOES NOT SEE THIS AS A PROBLEM THAT IS THEIR RESPONSIBILITY.
HEADREST TO FAR FORWARD, CAUSING NECK PAIN.
THE HEAD RESTRAINT AND SEAT ARE AWFUL. NECK IS SO FAR PUSHED FORWARD, IT GOES NUMB, GETS STIFF, TRAVELS TO THE REST OF BODY. GET INCREDIBLY DIZZY AFTER DRIVING. LEGS GET STIFF AND NUMB FROM NO LOWER LUMBAR SUPPORT. NEVER HAD ANYTHING EVEN REMOTELY CLOSE TO THIS ISSUE BEFORE PURCHASING CAR. I'M A TRAINER, LIVE A VERY ACTIVE LIFE.…
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THE HEAD RESTRAINT AND SEAT ARE AWFUL. NECK IS SO FAR PUSHED FORWARD, IT GOES NUMB, GETS STIFF, TRAVELS TO THE REST OF BODY. GET INCREDIBLY DIZZY AFTER DRIVING. LEGS GET STIFF AND NUMB FROM NO LOWER LUMBAR SUPPORT. NEVER HAD ANYTHING EVEN REMOTELY CLOSE TO THIS ISSUE BEFORE PURCHASING CAR. I'M A TRAINER, LIVE A VERY ACTIVE LIFE. MY QUALITY OF LIFE HAS DECREASED DUE TO PAIN AND SUFFERING FROM THIS VEHICLE.
EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE DRIVERS AND PASSENGERS FRONT SEATS. CAN NOT ADJUST SEATS TO RECTIFY THE PROBLEM. SITTING IN THEM FOR MORE THAN 30 MINUTES CAUSES SEVERE LOWER BACK PAIN AND DISCOMFORT.
THE HEAD RESTRAINT IS UNCOMFORTABLE ENOUGH TO CAUSE SEVER NECK PAIN/INJURY FOR ME. TO PROTECT FROM WHIP LASH THE DESIGN IS DONE IN WAY TO CAUSE INJURY TO NECK. THIS IS REALLY BAD, MANY ARE GOING TO END UP IN THERAPY OR ORTHOPEDICS DUE TO POOR DESIGN LIKE ME :-( *TR
THE REGULATIONS ON SEAT HEAD RESTS HAVE TO BE CHANGED. I LIKE TO SIT WITH MY SEAT BACK UP WHICH FORCES THE HEAD REST INTO THE BACK OF MY HEAD FORCING MY HEAD INTO A DOWNWARD POSITION. I ENDURED CONSTANT BACK PAIN BECAUSE OF THE CAR. I ENDED UP SELLING MY CIVIC SI BECAUSE IT WAS SO UNCOMFORTABLE AND BUYING AN OLDER VERSA. IF I…
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THE REGULATIONS ON SEAT HEAD RESTS HAVE TO BE CHANGED. I LIKE TO SIT WITH MY SEAT BACK UP WHICH FORCES THE HEAD REST INTO THE BACK OF MY HEAD FORCING MY HEAD INTO A DOWNWARD POSITION. I ENDURED CONSTANT BACK PAIN BECAUSE OF THE CAR. I ENDED UP SELLING MY CIVIC SI BECAUSE IT WAS SO UNCOMFORTABLE AND BUYING AN OLDER VERSA. IF I HADN'T SOLD IT, I WOULD HAVE BENT THE ACTUAL BARS BACK PROBABLY AFFECTING THEIR STRENGTH. IN FACT, FOR A WHILE I HAD TO DRIVE WITH THE HEADREST TURNED AROUND JUST SO THE CAR WAS BEARABLE. *TR
I OWN A 2013 HONDA. I JUST FOUND THIS NHTSA WEBSITE TO REGISTER COMPLAINTS. WHEN I SIT IN A CAR, I SIT CORRECTLY, WITH THE SEAT FAIRLY UPRIGHT AND MY SHOULDERS AGAINST THE SEAT BACK. WHEN I DO THIS IN THE 2013 HONDA, AND ALL NEW CARS I HAVE SAT IN, MY HEAD IS FORCED FORWARD AND DOWN IN A VERY UNNATURAL, UNCOMFORTABLE…
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I OWN A 2013 HONDA. I JUST FOUND THIS NHTSA WEBSITE TO REGISTER COMPLAINTS. WHEN I SIT IN A CAR, I SIT CORRECTLY, WITH THE SEAT FAIRLY UPRIGHT AND MY SHOULDERS AGAINST THE SEAT BACK. WHEN I DO THIS IN THE 2013 HONDA, AND ALL NEW CARS I HAVE SAT IN, MY HEAD IS FORCED FORWARD AND DOWN IN A VERY UNNATURAL, UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION. THE ONLY WAY I CAN LOOK AT THE ROD IS TO LIFT MY SHOULDERS OFF THE SEAT BACK, AND THEN MY ENTIRE UPPER BODY WEIGHT IS SUPPORTED BY MY NECK. THE PROBLEM IS THE HEADREST IS AT LEAST 1 INCH TOO FAR FORWARD. MY WIFE CANNOT SIT IN THE CAR FOR MORE THAT 30 MINUTES WITHOUT GETTING A HEADACHE. MY WIFE IS A PHYSIOTHERAPIST WITH 30 YEARS EXPERIENCE. HER COMMENT IS THAT THE HEADRESTS ARE FORCING US TO SIT IN ERGONOMICALLY INCORRECT POSITIONS. OLDER CARS HAD VERTICAL HEADRESTS THAT DID NOT CAUSE THIS PROBLEM. I UNDERSTAND THE NEW HEADREST POSITIONS ARE DUE TO NHTSA REGULATIONS PHASED IN 2009 TO PREVENT WHIPLASH. THE ONLY WAY I CAN DRIVE MY CAR NOW IS TO PULL THE HEADREST OUT AND PUT THEM IN BACKWARDS. THIS OBVIOUSLY RESULTS IN LESS WHIPLASH PROTECTION THAN EVEN THE OLD VERTICAL HEADRESTS FROM A WEB SEARCH, I HAVE FOUND THAT MANY OTHER CAR OWNERS ARE BEING FORCED TO DO THE SAME THING. NOW IN MANY NEW CARS YOU CANNOT REMOVE THE HEADREST TO TURN IT AROUND. BECAUSE OF THIS NHTSA RULING I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BUY A NEW CAR, AND THE CAR I DRIVE IS NOT SAFE IN THE CASE OF A REAR END COLLISION. (NOTE: I LIVE IN CANADA BUT AM AFFECTED BY THIS NHTSA RULING. THE ZIP CODE AND PHONE NUMBER BELOW ARE NOT VALID, AS ONLY US INFORMATION IS ALLOWED IN THESE FIELDS). *TR
Official recalls
0No recalls in this snapshot.
Model-level recall history does not show whether a particular VIN is affected or has received a repair. Check a VIN with NHTSA ↗
NHTSA investigations
2EA21002 · Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture
Opened Sep 17, 2021 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module; Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
EA19001 · Electrical Overstress
Opened Apr 19, 2019 · Closed Sep 19, 2024
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags: Air Bag/restraint Control Module
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW. The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications. The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU. In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle. Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time. In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners. Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.