DP26008 · Loss Of Motive Power
Opened Sep 3, 2026 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Engine And Engine Cooling
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on August 5, 2026, requesting a defect investigation into the 2.0 Liter EcoBoost engine on model year 2015-2018 Ford Edge vehicles. The petition alleges that engine coolant intrusion results in a significant loss of engine power, accompanied by an "Engine Coolant Over Temperature" warning message. The petition further alleges that after the vehicle has sat and cooled down, the engine runs roughly and generates a check engine light for a cylinder misfire. This defect petition is being opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11754989.
PE24027 · Loss Of Braking Caused By Rear Brake Hose Failure
Opened Oct 3, 2024 · Closed Oct 30, 2025
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Service Brakes; Service Brakes, Hydraulic:foundation Components:hoses, Lines/piping, And Fittings
On October 3, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate instances of rear brake hose ruptures causing a sudden and unexpected loss of braking in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Edge vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company. The complaints allege that, without warning, the vehicle lost its ability to brake causing an unanticipated increase in the vehicle’s stopping distance. The complaints also allege that, prior to the rear brake hose rupture event, the vehicle had been serviced under recall 20V-469. Recall 20V469 involved MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles which may experience front brake hose ruptures causing increased brake pedal travel and a reduction in the rate of deceleration. Ford identified the cause of this safety defect as a consistent localized failure of the internal reinforcement braid of the brake hose due to cyclic fatigue via tensile/bending and torsional inputs during suspension and steering articulations. Ford also identified that only 88% of suspension articulation was utilized on the front brake hose test rig during life cycle testing. These findings, along with ODI’s identification of an emerging trend involving rear brake hose ruptures, prompted the opening of this investigation. ODI identified 64 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires related to this investigation, 2 involving a crash. These consumers were interviewed and reported experiencing sudden loss of braking ability while traveling at low and highway speeds without any prior warning such as a “low brake fluid” warning indicator. Consumers reported that, as they tried to stop their vehicle, the brake pedal traveling to the floorboard and the vehicle required more stopping distance than anticipated or considered normal. Consumers also observed brake fluid present on the rear tires and roadway near the rear tires immediately after the incident. Some consumers provided photographs of the rear brake hose ruptures which depicted a similar rupture pattern and location (near the crimp on the dynamic section of the brake hose). 1 photograph showed an installation alignment mark pulled out near the crimp suggesting exposure to unanticipated tensile forces pulling the hose away from the crimp. During this investigation, Ford responded to Information Request Letters detailing information such as warranty claim data, brake hose specifications and engineering drawings, production part changes logs, and Ford’s assessments of potential root cause. Ford reported that the front and rear brake jounce hoses equipped on the subject vehicle population utilized the same construction and material. Therefore, Ford’s analysis consisted of a comparison between the front and rear hoses demonstrating that the rear hose bend radii in full jounce and full rebound were larger than the front hose. Ford also described that the two hoses are exposed to different loading environments as the rear brake hose is exposed to suspension inputs only, while the front hose is exposed to both suspension and steering inputs; thus, the rear hose is subjected to lower tension and fatigue loads. However, it is important to point out that larger bend radii alone do not necessarily mean a brake hose can withstand the dynamic loading requirements of a brake hose (as discussed earlier, the defect identified in the front brake hoses were attributed to the hose material). Rear brake hose failures were identified through exemplar vehicle and parts inspections conducted by NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Testing Center. Ford stated that its investigation did not identify any specific or common root cause for this safety defect, and that brake hoses can fail for many reasons including contact with road debris, improper vehicle servicing, and fatigue, as well as vehicle age and miles in service. Based on its assessment of failure rates and warranty claims, Ford concluded that the rear brake hose ruptures did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety because consumers would experience a progressive leak accompanied by a red brake warning indicator within the instrument panel and would not experience a total loss of braking due to the diagonally split brake system. Note that these assessments are contrary to the consumer experiences described above. As previously described, consumers described a sudden, unexpected loss of braking ability with no prior warning in their instrument cluster (not a progressive leak) and an increase in anticipated vehicle stopping distance (presenting an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety). ODI conveyed these perspectives and investigative findings to Ford during a technical discussion on July 23, 2025. On August 22, 2025, Ford submittedrecall 25V-544 which included MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles, for a total recall population of 499,129 vehicles. As described in the Part 573, in September 2024, Ford concluded that this concern did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and closed its investigation into allegations involving rear brake jounce hose ruptures within this vehicle population. Ford reopened this investigation in July 2025 following the technical discussion with ODI referenced above. Ford identified the safety defect as a rupture of the rear brake jounce hose resulting in an increase in pedal travel and increase in vehicle stopping distance elevating the risk of a crash. To date, Ford has not fully determined the root cause of this safety defect and is currently working to develop a remedy program. In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Service Brakes
On October 3, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate instances of rear brake hose ruptures causing a sudden and unexpected loss of braking in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Edge vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company. The complaints allege that, without warning, the vehicle lost its ability to brake causing an unanticipated increase in the vehicle’s stopping distance. The complaints also allege that, prior to the rear brake hose rupture event, the vehicle had been serviced under recall 20V-469. Recall 20V469 involved MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles which may experience front brake hose ruptures causing increased brake pedal travel and a reduction in the rate of deceleration. Ford identified the cause of this safety defect as a consistent localized failure of the internal reinforcement braid of the brake hose due to cyclic fatigue via tensile/bending and torsional inputs during suspension and steering articulations. Ford also identified that only 88% of suspension articulation was utilized on the front brake hose test rig during life cycle testing. These findings, along with ODI’s identification of an emerging trend involving rear brake hose ruptures, prompted the opening of this investigation. ODI identified 64 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires related to this investigation, 2 involving a crash. These consumers were interviewed and reported experiencing sudden loss of braking ability while traveling at low and highway speeds without any prior warning such as a “low brake fluid” warning indicator. Consumers reported that, as they tried to stop their vehicle, the brake pedal traveling to the floorboard and the vehicle required more stopping distance than anticipated or considered normal. Consumers also observed brake fluid present on the rear tires and roadway near the rear tires immediately after the incident. Some consumers provided photographs of the rear brake hose ruptures which depicted a similar rupture pattern and location (near the crimp on the dynamic section of the brake hose). 1 photograph showed an installation alignment mark pulled out near the crimp suggesting exposure to unanticipated tensile forces pulling the hose away from the crimp. During this investigation, Ford responded to Information Request Letters detailing information such as warranty claim data, brake hose specifications and engineering drawings, production part changes logs, and Ford’s assessments of potential root cause. Ford reported that the front and rear brake jounce hoses equipped on the subject vehicle population utilized the same construction and material. Therefore, Ford’s analysis consisted of a comparison between the front and rear hoses demonstrating that the rear hose bend radii in full jounce and full rebound were larger than the front hose. Ford also described that the two hoses are exposed to different loading environments as the rear brake hose is exposed to suspension inputs only, while the front hose is exposed to both suspension and steering inputs; thus, the rear hose is subjected to lower tension and fatigue loads. However, it is important to point out that larger bend radii alone do not necessarily mean a brake hose can withstand the dynamic loading requirements of a brake hose (as discussed earlier, the defect identified in the front brake hoses were attributed to the hose material). Rear brake hose failures were identified through exemplar vehicle and parts inspections conducted by NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Testing Center. Ford stated that its investigation did not identify any specific or common root cause for this safety defect, and that brake hoses can fail for many reasons including contact with road debris, improper vehicle servicing, and fatigue, as well as vehicle age and miles in service. Based on its assessment of failure rates and warranty claims, Ford concluded that the rear brake hose ruptures did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety because consumers would experience a progressive leak accompanied by a red brake warning indicator within the instrument panel and would not experience a total loss of braking due to the diagonally split brake system. Note that these assessments are contrary to the consumer experiences described above. As previously described, consumers described a sudden, unexpected loss of braking ability with no prior warning in their instrument cluster (not a progressive leak) and an increase in anticipated vehicle stopping distance (presenting an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety). ODI conveyed these perspectives and investigative findings to Ford during a technical discussion on July 23, 2025. On August 22, 2025, Ford submittedrecall 25V-544 which included MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles, for a total recall population of 499,129 vehicles. As described in the Part 573, in September 2024, Ford concluded that this concern did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and closed its investigation into allegations involving rear brake jounce hose ruptures within this vehicle population. Ford reopened this investigation in July 2025 following the technical discussion with ODI referenced above. Ford identified the safety defect as a rupture of the rear brake jounce hose resulting in an increase in pedal travel and increase in vehicle stopping distance elevating the risk of a crash. To date, Ford has not fully determined the root cause of this safety defect and is currently working to develop a remedy program. In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Service Brakes, Hydraulic:foundation Components:hoses, Lines/piping, And Fittings
On October 3, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate instances of rear brake hose ruptures causing a sudden and unexpected loss of braking in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Edge vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company. The complaints allege that, without warning, the vehicle lost its ability to brake causing an unanticipated increase in the vehicle’s stopping distance. The complaints also allege that, prior to the rear brake hose rupture event, the vehicle had been serviced under recall 20V-469. Recall 20V469 involved MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles which may experience front brake hose ruptures causing increased brake pedal travel and a reduction in the rate of deceleration. Ford identified the cause of this safety defect as a consistent localized failure of the internal reinforcement braid of the brake hose due to cyclic fatigue via tensile/bending and torsional inputs during suspension and steering articulations. Ford also identified that only 88% of suspension articulation was utilized on the front brake hose test rig during life cycle testing. These findings, along with ODI’s identification of an emerging trend involving rear brake hose ruptures, prompted the opening of this investigation. ODI identified 64 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires related to this investigation, 2 involving a crash. These consumers were interviewed and reported experiencing sudden loss of braking ability while traveling at low and highway speeds without any prior warning such as a “low brake fluid” warning indicator. Consumers reported that, as they tried to stop their vehicle, the brake pedal traveling to the floorboard and the vehicle required more stopping distance than anticipated or considered normal. Consumers also observed brake fluid present on the rear tires and roadway near the rear tires immediately after the incident. Some consumers provided photographs of the rear brake hose ruptures which depicted a similar rupture pattern and location (near the crimp on the dynamic section of the brake hose). 1 photograph showed an installation alignment mark pulled out near the crimp suggesting exposure to unanticipated tensile forces pulling the hose away from the crimp. During this investigation, Ford responded to Information Request Letters detailing information such as warranty claim data, brake hose specifications and engineering drawings, production part changes logs, and Ford’s assessments of potential root cause. Ford reported that the front and rear brake jounce hoses equipped on the subject vehicle population utilized the same construction and material. Therefore, Ford’s analysis consisted of a comparison between the front and rear hoses demonstrating that the rear hose bend radii in full jounce and full rebound were larger than the front hose. Ford also described that the two hoses are exposed to different loading environments as the rear brake hose is exposed to suspension inputs only, while the front hose is exposed to both suspension and steering inputs; thus, the rear hose is subjected to lower tension and fatigue loads. However, it is important to point out that larger bend radii alone do not necessarily mean a brake hose can withstand the dynamic loading requirements of a brake hose (as discussed earlier, the defect identified in the front brake hoses were attributed to the hose material). Rear brake hose failures were identified through exemplar vehicle and parts inspections conducted by NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Testing Center. Ford stated that its investigation did not identify any specific or common root cause for this safety defect, and that brake hoses can fail for many reasons including contact with road debris, improper vehicle servicing, and fatigue, as well as vehicle age and miles in service. Based on its assessment of failure rates and warranty claims, Ford concluded that the rear brake hose ruptures did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety because consumers would experience a progressive leak accompanied by a red brake warning indicator within the instrument panel and would not experience a total loss of braking due to the diagonally split brake system. Note that these assessments are contrary to the consumer experiences described above. As previously described, consumers described a sudden, unexpected loss of braking ability with no prior warning in their instrument cluster (not a progressive leak) and an increase in anticipated vehicle stopping distance (presenting an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety). ODI conveyed these perspectives and investigative findings to Ford during a technical discussion on July 23, 2025. On August 22, 2025, Ford submittedrecall 25V-544 which included MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles, for a total recall population of 499,129 vehicles. As described in the Part 573, in September 2024, Ford concluded that this concern did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and closed its investigation into allegations involving rear brake jounce hose ruptures within this vehicle population. Ford reopened this investigation in July 2025 following the technical discussion with ODI referenced above. Ford identified the safety defect as a rupture of the rear brake jounce hose resulting in an increase in pedal travel and increase in vehicle stopping distance elevating the risk of a crash. To date, Ford has not fully determined the root cause of this safety defect and is currently working to develop a remedy program. In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
EA21002 · Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture
Opened Sep 17, 2021 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module; Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
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