NHTSA owner reports · September 18, 2026 snapshot.
Vehicle Speed Control complaints
18 reportsClear category filterMileage unknown · Jan 16, 2026
Service BrakesVehicle Speed Control
On [XXX] at [XXX]. in Cupey, Puerto Rico I was moving from west to east in the[XXX] parish underground parking. While parking my car in reverse, I needed to drive forward to accommodate the car in the parking space. As I shifted to drive, the vehicle accelerated on its own, the breaks were not working and hit a concrete wall. Al…
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On [XXX] at [XXX]. in Cupey, Puerto Rico I was moving from west to east in the[XXX] parish underground parking. While parking my car in reverse, I needed to drive forward to accommodate the car in the parking space. As I shifted to drive, the vehicle accelerated on its own, the breaks were not working and hit a concrete wall. All the airbags exploded, and I was stuck inside the car. The car doors did not open from inside. The acceleration and break systems failed to work at the moment of the car crash. My safety was affected by the car crash impact. I was pressed against the seat by the airbags and the doors were not opening from the inside. I have panic attacks after this incident. The problem has not been confirmed by a car dealer nor independent service center. The vehicle has been inspected by an insurance representative. There were no warning lamps, messages or other symptoms of the problem prior the the failure. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
NHTSA ODI #11711536
Mileage unknown · Aug 28, 2025
Power TrainSeat BeltsVehicle Speed Control
Falla en tren motriz o transmisión
NHTSA ODI #11683640
Mileage unknown · Nov 26, 2024
Service BrakesSteeringVehicle Speed ControlCrash
I am not sure exactly what happened but their was indeed an internal systems failure of some sort that definitely needs to be resolved and the public needs to be made aware of. I lost control of my vehicle do to some circumstance beyond my control and I was nearly killed an a father and son as well. I hope the government gets to…
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I am not sure exactly what happened but their was indeed an internal systems failure of some sort that definitely needs to be resolved and the public needs to be made aware of. I lost control of my vehicle do to some circumstance beyond my control and I was nearly killed an a father and son as well. I hope the government gets to the bottom of this and makes all humans aware of this threat to our way of life and human's lifes in general. Regardless I was driving and minding my own business and causing no harm to anyone when I lost control of my vehicle and it swerved to the right in an intersection causing an accident. Please utilize our tax money properly and make sure the people responsible for this are held accountable in accordance with the law and make the public aware of who they are. I thank you for your assistance in making sure humans and businesses are held accountable under the law of the laws of the country in relations to vehicle safety.
NHTSA ODI #11627614
39,000 miles · Nov 29, 2018
Service BrakesVehicle Speed ControlCrash
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS STARTED, IT SUDDENLY ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN. AFTER SWITCHING THE TRANSMISSION FROM PARK INTO REVERSE, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED BACKWARDS AND CRASHED INTO A CEMENT BLOCK. THE DRIVER THEN SHIFTED INTO DRIVE AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD, NEARLY CRASHING…
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS STARTED, IT SUDDENLY ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN. AFTER SWITCHING THE TRANSMISSION FROM PARK INTO REVERSE, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED BACKWARDS AND CRASHED INTO A CEMENT BLOCK. THE DRIVER THEN SHIFTED INTO DRIVE AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD, NEARLY CRASHING INTO A SECOND VEHICLE. DURING THE INCIDENT, THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS BEING DEPRESSED, BUT THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. THE MANUFACTURER AND LOCAL DEALER (DUNNING TOYOTA, 3745 JACKSON RD, ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN) WERE NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURES. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 39,000.
NHTSA ODI #11154673
54,000 miles · Sep 10, 2018
Vehicle Speed Control
2015 TOYOTA COROLLA ACCELERATED ON IT;S OWN WHEN SLOWING DOWN ON BRAKE TO TURN INTO MY DRIVEWAY. I WAS SCARED FROM IT AND HAD NO CONTROL AND TOOK MY FOOT OFF THE BRAKE AND PUMPED IT AND STOPPED THE CAR BEFORE IT CRASHED INTO THE BRICK WALL. I NEVER HAD THIS ISSUE BEFORE AND HOPEFULLY, NEVER AGAIN. MY CAR IS AT 54K IN MILES AND I…
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2015 TOYOTA COROLLA ACCELERATED ON IT;S OWN WHEN SLOWING DOWN ON BRAKE TO TURN INTO MY DRIVEWAY. I WAS SCARED FROM IT AND HAD NO CONTROL AND TOOK MY FOOT OFF THE BRAKE AND PUMPED IT AND STOPPED THE CAR BEFORE IT CRASHED INTO THE BRICK WALL. I NEVER HAD THIS ISSUE BEFORE AND HOPEFULLY, NEVER AGAIN. MY CAR IS AT 54K IN MILES AND I WAS GOING AT 10 MPH.
NHTSA ODI #11128478
74,000 miles · Aug 14, 2018
EngineFuel/propulsion SystemVehicle Speed Control
COMPUTER IS SENDING FALSE CODES. CAR WON'T ACCELERATE FROM A STOP THEN EVENTUALLY STARTS MOVING VERY SLOWLY. UNHOOKING THE BATTERY THEN HOOKING IT BACK UP DOES A HARD RESET ON THE COMPUTER WHICH MAKES THE CAR WORK PROPERLY FOR A DAY OR SO THEN IT DOES IT AGAIN. WAS TOLD BY MECHANIC THE COMPUTER DOESN'T KNOW WHAT GEAR THE CAR …
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COMPUTER IS SENDING FALSE CODES. CAR WON'T ACCELERATE FROM A STOP THEN EVENTUALLY STARTS MOVING VERY SLOWLY. UNHOOKING THE BATTERY THEN HOOKING IT BACK UP DOES A HARD RESET ON THE COMPUTER WHICH MAKES THE CAR WORK PROPERLY FOR A DAY OR SO THEN IT DOES IT AGAIN. WAS TOLD BY MECHANIC THE COMPUTER DOESN'T KNOW WHAT GEAR THE CAR IS IN.
NHTSA ODI #11120000
11,000 miles · Jun 29, 2018
EngineVehicle Speed Control
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 35 MPH, THE VEHICLE'S RPMS MALFUNCTIONED. AFTER RELEASING THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED RAPIDLY ON ITS OWN. THE CONTACT DEPRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL TO SLOW DOWN THE VEHICLE. BIG ISLAND TOYOTA (811 KANOELEHUA AVE, HILO, HAWAII 96720, (808) 935-2920) …
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 35 MPH, THE VEHICLE'S RPMS MALFUNCTIONED. AFTER RELEASING THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED RAPIDLY ON ITS OWN. THE CONTACT DEPRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL TO SLOW DOWN THE VEHICLE. BIG ISLAND TOYOTA (811 KANOELEHUA AVE, HILO, HAWAII 96720, (808) 935-2920) WAS NOTIFIED, BUT COULD NOT DIAGNOSE THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 11,000. *TT *TR
NHTSA ODI #11104787
50,321 miles · Jun 11, 2018
Air BagsVehicle Speed ControlCrash
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE DRIVING 2 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INDEPENDENTLY WHEN THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS DEPRESSED. AS A RESULT, THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A WALL AT A PARKING LOT. THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. A POLICE REPORT WAS NOT FILED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES SUSTAINED. A DEALER WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF THE…
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE DRIVING 2 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INDEPENDENTLY WHEN THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS DEPRESSED. AS A RESULT, THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A WALL AT A PARKING LOT. THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. A POLICE REPORT WAS NOT FILED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES SUSTAINED. A DEALER WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF THE FAILURE. THE MANUFACTURER WAS MADE AWARE OF THE FAILURE AND PROVIDED THE CONTACT WITH CASE NUMBER: [XXX]. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS APPROXIMATELY 50,321. *TT INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6). *TR
NHTSA ODI #11101139
30,900 miles · Jun 12, 2017
Vehicle Speed ControlCrash
TL* THE CONTACT OWNED A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE DRIVING 25 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INDEPENDENTLY WITHOUT WARNING. THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A BOULDER ON THE ROADWAY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE ROLLED OVER. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE VEHICLE WAS DESTROYED AND TOWED TO AN INDEPENDENT FACILITY. THERE WERE NO INJ…
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNED A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE DRIVING 25 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INDEPENDENTLY WITHOUT WARNING. THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A BOULDER ON THE ROADWAY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE ROLLED OVER. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE VEHICLE WAS DESTROYED AND TOWED TO AN INDEPENDENT FACILITY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE APPROXIMATE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 30,900.
NHTSA ODI #10994450
22,000 miles · Dec 19, 2016
Electrical SystemPower TrainVehicle Speed ControlCrash
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. AFTER THE VEHICLE WAS TURNED OFF AND THE KEY WAS REMOVED FROM THE IGNITION SWITCH, THE VEHICLE INDEPENDENTLY BEGAN TO ROLL AND CRASHED INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE. A POLICE REPORT WAS NOT FILED AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO SURGE FOR APPROXIMATELY A …
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA COROLLA. AFTER THE VEHICLE WAS TURNED OFF AND THE KEY WAS REMOVED FROM THE IGNITION SWITCH, THE VEHICLE INDEPENDENTLY BEGAN TO ROLL AND CRASHED INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE. A POLICE REPORT WAS NOT FILED AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO SURGE FOR APPROXIMATELY A MONTH BEFORE THE FAILURE OCCURRED. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE AND SENT A FIELD SUPERVISOR TO DIAGNOSE THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE WAS UNABLE TO BE DUPLICATED. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE APPROXIMATE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 22,000.
NHTSA ODI #10936233
NHTSA investigations
2EA21002 · Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture
Opened Sep 17, 2021 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module; Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
EA19001 · Electrical Overstress
Opened Apr 19, 2019 · Closed Sep 19, 2024
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags: Air Bag/restraint Control Module
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW. The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications. The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU. In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle. Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time. In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners. Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.