AS I WAS DRIVING AROUND A CURVED STREET, MY STEERING WHEEL LOCKS ON ME. I COULD NOT SWERVE AND TURN MY CAR TO FOLLOW THE CURVED STREET. I COULD NOT MOVE THE WHEEL AT ALL. MY CAR RAN INTO A TREE HEAD FIRST. ALL THE AIRBAGS DEPLOYED AND SMOKE APPEARED. MY ENTIRE CAR WAS TOTALED AND SMASHED IN THE FRONT. SCARIEST THING BECAUS…
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AS I WAS DRIVING AROUND A CURVED STREET, MY STEERING WHEEL LOCKS ON ME. I COULD NOT SWERVE AND TURN MY CAR TO FOLLOW THE CURVED STREET. I COULD NOT MOVE THE WHEEL AT ALL. MY CAR RAN INTO A TREE HEAD FIRST. ALL THE AIRBAGS DEPLOYED AND SMOKE APPEARED. MY ENTIRE CAR WAS TOTALED AND SMASHED IN THE FRONT. SCARIEST THING BECAUSE I HAD NO CONTROL. THANK GOD, MY 1 YEAR OLD SON WAS NOT IN THE BACKSEAT OR ELSE HE WOULD HAVE BEEN FATALLY INJURED WITH THOSE AIRBAGS. I NEED TO KNOW WHAT CAN BE DONE. TOYOTA HAS HAD RECALLS IN THE PAST AND THIS COULD HAVE ENDED MY LIFE. *TR
NHTSA ODI #10706314
34,000 miles · Jan 23, 2015
Air BagsEngineStructureCrash
THIS AM I HIT A DEER ON THE WAY TO WORK HEAD ON AT 65-67 MPH AND NOT ONE AIR BAG DEPLOYED!!! THE ENTIRE FRONT END CRUMPLED TO THE WINDSHIELD AREA AND THE RADIATOR AND PARTS TORN LOSE TO THE TOP OF ENGINE AND NOT ONE AIR BAG DEPLOYED. EVERYONE AT THE WRECK COULD NOT BELIEVE IT AND NOW I AM TERRIFIED OF THE CAR IF DIRECT CONTACT A…
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THIS AM I HIT A DEER ON THE WAY TO WORK HEAD ON AT 65-67 MPH AND NOT ONE AIR BAG DEPLOYED!!! THE ENTIRE FRONT END CRUMPLED TO THE WINDSHIELD AREA AND THE RADIATOR AND PARTS TORN LOSE TO THE TOP OF ENGINE AND NOT ONE AIR BAG DEPLOYED. EVERYONE AT THE WRECK COULD NOT BELIEVE IT AND NOW I AM TERRIFIED OF THE CAR IF DIRECT CONTACT AT THAT SPEED DOES NOT OPEN THE SAFETY EQUIPMENT WHAT WILL? THIS CAR IS NOT SAFE. *TR
NHTSA ODI #10678631
4,900 miles · Dec 23, 2014
Air BagsStructureVehicle Speed ControlCrash
I WAS MAKING A RIGHT TURN PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE IN A SHOPPING MALL. I WAS APPROXIMATELY 1/2 TO 3/4 OF THE WAY IN WHEN THE VEHICLE TOOK OFF AND WENT INTO A TREE AND THEN A WALL. I WOULD GUESS THE VEHICLE TRAVELED APPROXIMATELY 40 FEET AFTER THE SUDDEN AND UNINTENDED ACCELERATION. THIS DEFINITELY WAS SUDDEN AND UNINTEND…
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I WAS MAKING A RIGHT TURN PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE IN A SHOPPING MALL. I WAS APPROXIMATELY 1/2 TO 3/4 OF THE WAY IN WHEN THE VEHICLE TOOK OFF AND WENT INTO A TREE AND THEN A WALL. I WOULD GUESS THE VEHICLE TRAVELED APPROXIMATELY 40 FEET AFTER THE SUDDEN AND UNINTENDED ACCELERATION. THIS DEFINITELY WAS SUDDEN AND UNINTENDED ACCELERATION. THE FRONT END OF THE VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED BY THE TREE AND THE WALL THE AIR BAG DID NOT DEPLOY. *TR
NHTSA ODI #10667863
Mileage unknown · Sep 22, 2014
StructureVisibility/wiper
AS I WAS DRIVING THROUGH THE RAIN STORM AT NIGHT, I NOTICED MY WINDSHIELD WIPER MOTOR STOP WORKING. THE NEXT MORNING I FOUND THERE IS A FLAW OF DESIGN WHERE THE FLUID DELIVERY SYSTEM IS BELOW THE ENGINE HOOD WHICH IS A COMPLETELY AND UTTERLY MORONIC. I FOUND OUT DAMAGED/DENT HOOD CAUSED IT TO IMPROPERLY MALFUNCTION. *TR
NHTSA ODI #10638057
Mileage unknown · Sep 16, 2014
Structure
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2014 TOYOTA COROLLA. THE CONTACT STATED THAT WHEN THE SUN LIGHT REFLECTED ON THE INSTRUMENT PANEL, THE SPEEDOMETER WAS UNABLE TO BE READ DUE TO THE REFLECTION. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO A DEALER WHERE IT WAS DIAGNOSED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS DESIGNED THAT WAY. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURER WAS…
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2014 TOYOTA COROLLA. THE CONTACT STATED THAT WHEN THE SUN LIGHT REFLECTED ON THE INSTRUMENT PANEL, THE SPEEDOMETER WAS UNABLE TO BE READ DUE TO THE REFLECTION. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO A DEALER WHERE IT WAS DIAGNOSED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS DESIGNED THAT WAY. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS UNKNOWN.
NHTSA ODI #10633651
7,000 miles · Aug 5, 2014
Electrical SystemStructure
TOYOTA REDESIGNED THE INSTRUMENT PANEL AND WENT FROM A SINGLE CLEAR COVER ANGLED TOWARDS THE FRONT TO 2 SEPARATE INSTRUMENT COVERS ANGLED TOWARDS THE LEFT AND RIGHT SIDE. THE DESIGN OF THESE COVERS RESULTS IN EXTREME REFLECTIONS MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO READ THE SPEEDOMETER DURING MORNIN…
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TOYOTA REDESIGNED THE INSTRUMENT PANEL AND WENT FROM A SINGLE CLEAR COVER ANGLED TOWARDS THE FRONT TO 2 SEPARATE INSTRUMENT COVERS ANGLED TOWARDS THE LEFT AND RIGHT SIDE. THE DESIGN OF THESE COVERS RESULTS IN EXTREME REFLECTIONS MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO READ THE SPEEDOMETER DURING MORNING AND AFTERNOON HOURS WHEN THE SUN ENTERS THE VEHICLE FROM THE SIDE. THE REFLECTIONS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS ARE SO EXTREME THAT I CAN'T EVEN SEE THE SPEEDOMETER NEEDLE. TINTING THE WINDOWS DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. TOYOTA'S SERVICE DEPARTMENT TOLD ME THAT THEY ARE NOT ABLE TO FIX THE ISSUE. ON JULY, 03, 2014 I HAD TO GUESS MY SPEED BECAUSE THE SPEEDOMETER WAS UNREADABLE. I RECEIVED A SPEEDING TICKET SAYING THAT I WAS GOING AT A SPEED WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID A COLLISION. I HAVE DRIVEN OVER 20 DIFFERENT CARS IN MY LIFE AND NEVER HAD A SITUATION WHERE I WAS NOT ABLE TO READ THE SPEEDOMETER, EVEN IN MY 1968 OLDSMOBILE. TO MY UNDERSTANDING, A CAR MANUFACTURER HAS TO DESIGN THE SPEEDOMETER THE WAY THAT IT CAN BE READ UNDER ANY CONDITIONS WHICH IS POSSIBLE. IT APPEARS THAT TOYOTA'S ENGINEERS TOTALLY NEGLECTED THE PROBLEM OF SUNLIGHT REFLECTIONS WHEN DESIGNING THE 2014 COROLLA INSTRUMENT PANEL. *TR
NHTSA ODI #10619002
2,500 miles · Jul 17, 2014
Power TrainStructureCrash
I PUT THE CAR IN REVERSE TO PARK. SUDDENLY, THE CAR JUMPED INTO DRIVE, WENT FORWARD AND HIT A PARKED CAR. *TR
NHTSA ODI #10611367
5,560 miles · Jul 13, 2014
StructureVisibility
I WAS DRIVING IN A NORMAL LOCAL ROAD CONDITION IN A SUNDAY AFTERNOON. I WAS AWARE A 6" CRACK ON THE DRIVE-SIDE WINDSHIELD. IT STARTED FROM THE EDGE. NEXT MORNING WHEN I DROVE TO WORK, IT GREW TO ABOUT 2' LONG. IT SCARED ME AND I TOOK IMMEDIATELY ACTION AND FIXED IT NEXT DAY (TUESDAY). *TR
NHTSA ODI #10610145
458 miles · Apr 30, 2014
Structure
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2014 TOYOTA COROLLA. THE CONTACT STATED THAT AFTER CLOSING THE DRIVER'S DOOR, THE REAR DRIVER'S SIDE IMPLODED AND SHATTERED GLASS INTO THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER BUT WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURE WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 458 AND THE CURRENT MILEAGE …
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2014 TOYOTA COROLLA. THE CONTACT STATED THAT AFTER CLOSING THE DRIVER'S DOOR, THE REAR DRIVER'S SIDE IMPLODED AND SHATTERED GLASS INTO THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER BUT WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURE WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 458 AND THE CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 500.
NHTSA ODI #10585708
400 miles · Apr 5, 2014
Structure
SO I LEASED THE 2014 TOYOTA COROLLA S PLUS ON 2/23/14. APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 3 WEEKS LATER I WAS VACUUMING IT OUT, WHEN I LIFTED UP THE DRIVER SIDE CAR MAT IT HAD AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WATER UNDER THE MAT. SO I DRIED IT OUT, WHEN I VACUUMED IT OUT AGAIN A WEEK LATER THERE WAS WATER AGAIN UNDER THE DRIVER SIDE CAR MAT. AGAIN I DRIE…
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SO I LEASED THE 2014 TOYOTA COROLLA S PLUS ON 2/23/14. APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 3 WEEKS LATER I WAS VACUUMING IT OUT, WHEN I LIFTED UP THE DRIVER SIDE CAR MAT IT HAD AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WATER UNDER THE MAT. SO I DRIED IT OUT, WHEN I VACUUMED IT OUT AGAIN A WEEK LATER THERE WAS WATER AGAIN UNDER THE DRIVER SIDE CAR MAT. AGAIN I DRIED THE FLOOR AND I TOOK THE MATS OUT, LET THEM DRY OUT. THEN EVERY MORNING I WOULD CHECK AND WATER WAS UNDER MY DRIVER SIDE MAT. I TOOK IT TO THE DEALERSHIP THEY THINK POSSIBLY A LEAK IN THE WINDSHIELD. I EXPLAINED TO THEM SEVERAL TIMES, I ROLL MY DRIVER SIDE WINDOW DOWN WHEN I GET IN MY CAR EVERY MORNING AND WATER LITERALLY POURS IN WHEN I START DRIVING. MY ARMS AND LEGS ARE WET EVERY MORNING, IT'S FROM THE MORNING DEW ON THE CAR, IT RUNS RIGHT IN. I HAVE TO KEEP A TOWEL IN MY DOOR COMPARTMENT SO I CAN WIPE THE WATER OFF, SO IT DOESN'T RUIN THE INTERIOR. THE DEALERSHIP HAS NOW HAD IT FOR 3 DAYS, FRI, SAT, SUN TO "DRY IT OUT" BECAUSE THEY PULLED BACK THE CARPETS AND WATER WAS UNDER IT. THEY SAY NONE OF THE TUBES ARE LEAKING AND ALL THE TUBES ARE UNDER THE PASSENGER SIDE ANYWAYS, EVERYTHING CHECKS OUT FINE. PERSONALLY I THINK ITS A DESIGN FLAW, WITH THE WINDOWS SEEING AS HOW THE 2014 IS A REDESIGN. *TR
Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing (Toyota) is recalling certain 2011-2019 Corolla, 2011-2013 Matrix, 2012-2018 Avalon, and 2013-2018 Avalon Hybrid vehicles. During certain crashes, the air bag electronic control unit (ECU) may malfunction, possibly disabling the deployment of the air bags and/or seat belt pretensioners.
Consequence & remedy
Consequence: In the event of a crash, air bags and/or seat belt pretensioners that do not deploy as intended may increase the risk of injury.
Remedy: Toyota will notify owners, and dealers will inspect the ECU and install a noise filter between the air bag control module and its wire harness, as necessary, free of charge. Owners were notified of the safety risk beginning March 2, 2020. A second letter notifying owners of the remedy repair will be mailed between March 16, 2020 and June 27, 2020. Owners may contact Toyota customer service at 1-888-270-9371. Toyota's numbers for this recall are 20TB03, 20TA03 and 20TA05.
Toyota Motor Engineering & manufacturing North America, Inc. (Toyota) is recalling certain model year 2013-2014 Camry and Camry HV, model year 2013 Avalon and Avalon HV and model year 2014 Corolla vehicles. In the affected vehicles, the windshield wiper switch assembly may short circuit. As such, these vehicles fail to conform to the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, No. 104, "Windshield Wiping and Washing Systems."
Consequence & remedy
Consequence: A short circuit could cause inoperative windshield wipers, reducing driver visibility and increasing the risk of a crash.
Remedy: Toyota will notify owners, and dealers will replace the wiper switch assembly, free of charge. The recall began on November 8, 2013. Owners may contact Toyota at 1-800-331-4331.
Model-level recall history does not show whether a particular VIN is affected or has received a repair. Check a VIN with NHTSA ↗
NHTSA investigations
2
EA21002 · Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture
Opened Sep 17, 2021 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module; Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
EA19001 · Electrical Overstress
Opened Apr 19, 2019 · Closed Sep 19, 2024
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags: Air Bag/restraint Control Module
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW. The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications. The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU. In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle. Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time. In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners. Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.