NHTSA owner reports · September 18, 2026 snapshot.
What owners actually said
115 reports12,300 miles · Oct 29, 2025
Electrical SystemCrash
The contact owns a 2025 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while coming to a stop at a traffic light, the vehicle’s autopilot system became inoperable, and the vehicle unexpectedly accelerated up to approximately 13 MPH without any warning lights illuminated. The contact attempted to regain control of the steering; however, …
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The contact owns a 2025 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while coming to a stop at a traffic light, the vehicle’s autopilot system became inoperable, and the vehicle unexpectedly accelerated up to approximately 13 MPH without any warning lights illuminated. The contact attempted to regain control of the steering; however, due to the failure, the vehicle collided with another vehicle, resulting in severe damage to the driver’s side rear quarter panel, wheel, and tire. The contact stated that the air bags did not deploy during the incident. No injuries were sustained, and no medical attention was required. A police report was not filed. The contact expressed concern that the vehicle may present a potential safety hazard, as the failure had recurred on multiple occasions when attempting to drive the vehicle. The dealer was not contacted. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The manufacturer was not made aware of the failure. The approximate failure mileage was 12,300.
NHTSA ODI #11696376
Mileage unknown · Oct 28, 2025
Steering
On my 2025 Tesla Model 3 Highland, the right-turn signal button on the steering wheel fails to activate approximately 25–30% of the time. The issue is random and unpredictable. This has occurred while changing lanes on the freeway and when turning into shopping centers or side streets, leaving drivers behind me unaware of my int…
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On my 2025 Tesla Model 3 Highland, the right-turn signal button on the steering wheel fails to activate approximately 25–30% of the time. The issue is random and unpredictable. This has occurred while changing lanes on the freeway and when turning into shopping centers or side streets, leaving drivers behind me unaware of my intent and creating a safety hazard. The problem is worse when lane assist is active, as the vehicle resists the maneuver when the signal doesn’t engage, interpreting it as lane departure. The problem started happening at around 3,000 miles on the odometer and continues intermittently. I have not had Tesla service confirm the issue yet, but other owners have reported that replacement of the steering wheel does not resolve it, suggesting a systemic or software-related defect. No warning lamps or messages appear.
NHTSA ODI #11695969
Mileage unknown · Oct 27, 2025
Forward Collision AvoidanceVehicle Speed Control
After upgrading to FSD (sull self driving supervised) v14, The speed limit function HAS BEEN REMOVED. THERE IS NO WAY TO SET A MAX SPEED FOR CRUISE CONTROL. THE CAR SPEEDS UNSAFELY AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN FSD. THERE IS NO WAY TO CONTROL HOW FAST THE CAR CAN GO. It just "thinks" what speed is best. It constantly speeds 7-10 over in…
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After upgrading to FSD (sull self driving supervised) v14, The speed limit function HAS BEEN REMOVED. THERE IS NO WAY TO SET A MAX SPEED FOR CRUISE CONTROL. THE CAR SPEEDS UNSAFELY AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN FSD. THERE IS NO WAY TO CONTROL HOW FAST THE CAR CAN GO. It just "thinks" what speed is best. It constantly speeds 7-10 over in every setting above "SLOTH". SLOTH setting still DOES NOT have a speed limit setting. THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS. THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR NOT HAVING A MAX SPEED SETTING.
NHTSA ODI #11695786
Mileage unknown · Oct 23, 2025
Forward Collision AvoidanceVehicle Speed Control
In the New Tesla update to Full Self Drive they removed the ability to adjust the speed control while using FSD yet state "Note: You are responsible for the speed and control of your vehicle at all times, whether FSD (Supervised) is enabled or not."
NHTSA ODI #11695166
Mileage unknown · Oct 15, 2025
Forward Collision Avoidance
On [XXX] at approximately [XXX], I was driving northbound on [XXX] in Phoenix, Arizona in my 2025 Tesla Model 3 using Tesla's Full Self Driving (FSD) (Supervised) mode, when the incident occurred. I was paying close attention while driving in the left-most, non-HOV lane coming up to a bend just before the [XXX] overpass, when …
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On [XXX] at approximately [XXX], I was driving northbound on [XXX] in Phoenix, Arizona in my 2025 Tesla Model 3 using Tesla's Full Self Driving (FSD) (Supervised) mode, when the incident occurred. I was paying close attention while driving in the left-most, non-HOV lane coming up to a bend just before the [XXX] overpass, when I noticed traffic ahead slowing down and coming to a stop. I monitored FSD as it went through the act of braking; however, it seemed to wait a little longer than I would have expected before it actually started to brake, and when it did, the FSD system had to brake more aggressively than I've previously experienced. As it neared the end of the braking event (while the car was still moving), the FSD system disengaged itself without any input from me (neither by manually applying the brake pedal, applying torque to the steering wheel, or pressing the FSD button). When the FSD system disengaged itself, my vehicle continued forward. Had I not been paying attention, my vehicle would have collided with the rear end of the vehicle in front of me. Since I was paying close attention, I immediately slammed on the brakes after noticing that FSD had disengaged itself. I have dashcam footage of this event from the TeslaCam system; however, it does not include audio or telemetry data. Even without that, you can see in the video that my car noses down while FSD applies the brakes, then noses up when FSD disengages itself, and then noses down again when I apply the brakes manually. (The dashcam footage exceeds the 20MB limit; however, I can provide it via other means upon request.) It should be noted that I am an experienced Tesla FSD user, as I used it for over a year in my prior vehicle (2018 Tesla Model 3, which had been upgraded with the HW3 FSD computer), and this is the first time I have ever experienced a near collision event while using FSD or an event in which FSD disengaged on its own. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
NHTSA ODI #11693723
Mileage unknown · Oct 9, 2025
Forward Collision Avoidance
Tesla Model 3 2025, FSD V13.2.9, red light violation: Video enclosed: [XXX] It just happened and I have no more information can provide. Apparently FSD didn't warn me that it will run a red light. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
NHTSA ODI #11692348
Mileage unknown · Oct 9, 2025
Electrical SystemForward Collision AvoidanceLane DepartureCrash
Vehicle self drove took quick into an off ramp and took flight on cattle guard into a pole. The vehicle never attempted to make a emergency stop and no air bags deployed
NHTSA ODI #11692315
Mileage unknown · Oct 5, 2025
Unknown Or Other
On [XXX], I was driving my new 2025 Tesla Model 3 from my home in The Woodlands, TX, to San Antonio for a weekend trip. At approximately [XXX], while traveling on [XXX] a few miles before Exit [XXX], the vehicle suddenly behaved abnormally. It appeared to take control without my input, causing the entire car to wobble violently…
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On [XXX], I was driving my new 2025 Tesla Model 3 from my home in The Woodlands, TX, to San Antonio for a weekend trip. At approximately [XXX], while traveling on [XXX] a few miles before Exit [XXX], the vehicle suddenly behaved abnormally. It appeared to take control without my input, causing the entire car to wobble violently. I completely lost control of the vehicle for several seconds. There were no obstructions, debris, or road conditions that could explain this behavior. I have video recordings from the car’s cameras clearly showing the incident. After pulling over safely, I contacted Tesla, who guided me through some reboot steps. I decided to cancel my trip due to safety concerns and began returning home. However, at approximately [XXX], near Exit [XXX] on [XXX], the same issue occurred twice more. I immediately pulled over again and arranged for the car to be towed to Tesla Service. This was a terrifying and potentially fatal malfunction. It appears to involve a serious defect in the traction control, steering, or drive system. I request that NHTSA urgently investigate this issue to ensure the safety of other Tesla owners. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
NHTSA ODI #11691440
Mileage unknown · Sep 30, 2025
Forward Collision AvoidanceVehicle Speed Control
I want to add an update to my previous report # 11690629. I think it would be helpful to provide what the Max Speed should be based on my input. So, I will just resubmit the previous report with some additional information. On December 31, 2024, I purchased a new Tesla Model 3 Long Range with Full Self-Driving (FSD). The pro…
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I want to add an update to my previous report # 11690629. I think it would be helpful to provide what the Max Speed should be based on my input. So, I will just resubmit the previous report with some additional information. On December 31, 2024, I purchased a new Tesla Model 3 Long Range with Full Self-Driving (FSD). The problem is the car goes faster than it should when Full Self-Driving is activated. I have attached an example photo of the Tesla screen taken while the car is being controlled by FSD. It shows the actual speed limit of the road is 35 MPH, and the car is traveling at a steady speed of 51 MPH. It also shows a “Max Speed” of 64 MPH which means the car may travel that fast on this road if it chooses to. Since I use an Offset of 10%, the Max Speed in this 35 zone should be 39 MPH. However, the car increased it to 64 MPH, and I certainly did not use the right scroll wheel to increase it. This is clearly a safety issue which can lead to accidents. Tesla has made 5 attempts to fix this without success. On the last attempt (September 24, 2025), they refused to answer my questions such as: Why does the Max Speed suddenly change to a value much higher than my specification? They simply stated that the system was operating as designed. Really? It’s design to drive 51 MPH in a 35 MPH zone? Furthermore, they went on to say I should disengage the FSD system or intervene manually if I believe the car is operating in an unsafe manner. One reason I purchased this car was for FSD. I would expect them to fix it rather than my having to abandon this feature that I pay for. I hope you will encourage Tesla to fix this issue before there are any more FSD-related accidents.
NHTSA ODI #11690655
Mileage unknown · Sep 30, 2025
Forward Collision AvoidanceVehicle Speed Control
On December 31, 2024, I purchased a new Tesla Model 3 Long Range with Full Self-Driving (FSD). The problem is the car goes faster than it should when Full Self-Driving is activated. I have attached an example photo of the Tesla screen taken while the car is being controlled by FSD. It shows that the speed limit of the road i…
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On December 31, 2024, I purchased a new Tesla Model 3 Long Range with Full Self-Driving (FSD). The problem is the car goes faster than it should when Full Self-Driving is activated. I have attached an example photo of the Tesla screen taken while the car is being controlled by FSD. It shows that the speed limit of the road is 35 MPH, and the car is traveling at a steady speed of 51 MPH. It also shows a “Max Speed” of 64 MPH which means the car may travel that fast on this road if it chooses to. This is clearly a safety issue which can lead to accidents. Tesla has made 5 attempts to fix this without success. On the last attempt (September 24, 2025), they refused to answer my questions such as: Why does the Max Speed suddenly change to a value much higher than my specification? They simply stated that the system was operating as designed. Really? It’s design to drive 51 MPH in a 35 MPH zone? Furthermore, they went on to say I should disengage the FSD system or intervene manually if I believe the car is operating in an unsafe manner. One reason I purchased this car was for FSD. I would expect them to fix it rather than my having to abandon this feature that I pay for. I hope you will encourage Tesla to fix this issue before there are any more FSD-related accidents.
NHTSA ODI #11690629
NHTSA investigations
4EA26002 · Fsd Collisions In Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
Opened Mar 18, 2026 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
PE25012 · Traffic Safety Violations While Full Self Driving ("fsd") Is Engaged
Opened Oct 7, 2025 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
AQ25002 · Compliance With Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements
Opened Aug 20, 2025 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
PE24033 · Actually Smart Summon Sessions Resulting In low-speed Impacts.
Opened Jan 6, 2025 · Closed Apr 3, 2026
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas:autonomous/self Driving
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
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