NHTSA owner reports · September 18, 2026 snapshot.
Service Brakes complaints
6 reportsClear category filter114,000 miles · Aug 4, 2020
Service Brakes
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2012 LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER EVOQUE. THE CONTACT STATED THAT WHILE DRIVING AT SPEEDS BELOW 5 MPH, THE VEHICLE FAILED TO IMMEDIATELY STOP WHILE DEPRESSING THE BRAKE PEDAL WHICH EXTENDED THE STOPPING DISTANCE. THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE WAS NOT DETERMINED. THE LOCAL DEALER AND MANUFACTURER WERE NOT NOTIFIED OF …
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2012 LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER EVOQUE. THE CONTACT STATED THAT WHILE DRIVING AT SPEEDS BELOW 5 MPH, THE VEHICLE FAILED TO IMMEDIATELY STOP WHILE DEPRESSING THE BRAKE PEDAL WHICH EXTENDED THE STOPPING DISTANCE. THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE WAS NOT DETERMINED. THE LOCAL DEALER AND MANUFACTURER WERE NOT NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 114,000.
NHTSA ODI #11343256
10,300 miles · Sep 16, 2019
Service BrakesCrash
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2012 LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER EVOQUE. WHILE MAKING A LEFT TURN AND DEPRESSING THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE DID NOT STOP AND CRASHED INTO A GARAGE DOOR AT A VERY SLOW RATE OF SPEED. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED. THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE WAS NOT DETERMINED. JAKE KAPLAN'S LAND ROVER (1346 BALD HILL RD, WARWICK, RI…
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TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2012 LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER EVOQUE. WHILE MAKING A LEFT TURN AND DEPRESSING THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE DID NOT STOP AND CRASHED INTO A GARAGE DOOR AT A VERY SLOW RATE OF SPEED. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED. THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE WAS NOT DETERMINED. JAKE KAPLAN'S LAND ROVER (1346 BALD HILL RD, WARWICK, RI) AND MANUFACTURER WERE NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 10,300. *DT *AS
NHTSA ODI #11255894
90,000 miles · Jul 12, 2019
Service Brakes
WHILE DRIVING ON THE FREEWAY AT ABOUT 80 MPH, THE VEHICLE'S BRAKE MALFUNCTIONED AND I COULDN'T PRESS THE BRAKE PEDAL; IT WOULD NOT EVEN GO DOWN. THERE WERE 2 CARS DRIVING AHEAD OF ME ON THE LEFT LANE, THEREFORE, I TRIED TO PASS TO THE RIGHT LANE BY CHECKING WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SPACE BECAUSE THERE WERE 2 TRUCKS BEHIND ON THE RI…
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WHILE DRIVING ON THE FREEWAY AT ABOUT 80 MPH, THE VEHICLE'S BRAKE MALFUNCTIONED AND I COULDN'T PRESS THE BRAKE PEDAL; IT WOULD NOT EVEN GO DOWN. THERE WERE 2 CARS DRIVING AHEAD OF ME ON THE LEFT LANE, THEREFORE, I TRIED TO PASS TO THE RIGHT LANE BY CHECKING WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SPACE BECAUSE THERE WERE 2 TRUCKS BEHIND ON THE RIGHT 2 LANES. LUCKILY, I COULD PASS TO THE RIGHT LANES AND FINALLY TO THE SHOULDER TO TRY TO SLOW DOWN. THEN, I DROVE THE CAR TO A NEARBY ROADHOUSE AREA AND I STOPPED THE CAR THERE BY HANDBRAKE. THIS WAS REALLY UNBELIEVABLE AND TERRIFYING. THEN, THE VEHICLE WAS CARRIED BY A TOW TRUCK BACK TO ANKARA, AND THE CAR MECHANIC CHECKED THE CAR, WHERE THEY DETERMINED THAT A PART INSIDE THE BRAKE VACUUM MOTOR WAS TOTALLY BROKEN, AND THAT COULD HAVE CREATED A FATAL ACCIDENT,
NHTSA ODI #11231234
60,000 miles · Nov 6, 2018
Service Brakes
I WAS ON MY WAY TO CAMDEN AQUARIUM IT IS 75 MIN AWAY FROM MY HOUSE AFTER DRIVING 55 MIN JUST ABOUT TO PASS NJ TP EXIT 4 TOLL BOOTH THE BRAKES LOCKED UP ON ME I WAS UNABLE TO BRAKE I HAD MY WIFE AND 2 KIDS IN CAR IT WAS LIFE THREATENING SITUATION I PUT THE SHIFT IT IN NEUTRAL AND WAS ABLE TO PULL OVER IN SHOULDER LANE LUCKILY AND…
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I WAS ON MY WAY TO CAMDEN AQUARIUM IT IS 75 MIN AWAY FROM MY HOUSE AFTER DRIVING 55 MIN JUST ABOUT TO PASS NJ TP EXIT 4 TOLL BOOTH THE BRAKES LOCKED UP ON ME I WAS UNABLE TO BRAKE I HAD MY WIFE AND 2 KIDS IN CAR IT WAS LIFE THREATENING SITUATION I PUT THE SHIFT IT IN NEUTRAL AND WAS ABLE TO PULL OVER IN SHOULDER LANE LUCKILY AND PARKED IT WAS SHOCKING I TOWED THE CAR TO SERVICE CENTER AND WAS TOLD AFTER DIAGNOSTICS THAT VACUUM PART OF THE BREAK MALFUNCTIONED AND IT IS VERY EXPENSIVE TO FIT IT
NHTSA ODI #11149724
88,000 miles · Apr 4, 2018
Service Brakes
ON MARCH 24, 2018 AT APPROXIMATELY 11:30 AM I WAS TRAVELING ON THE HIGHWAY (FLORIDA TURNPIKE NORTH) AT AROUND 70 MPH WITH MY WIFE AND CHILD, AND SUDDENLY THE BRAKES STOPPED RESPONDING ON MY LAND ROVER EVOQUE. THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS HARD AND COULD NOT BE PRESSED, IT WOULD NOT RESPOND. WE WERE ABLE TO LOSE SPEED, MERGE TO THE RIGHT…
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ON MARCH 24, 2018 AT APPROXIMATELY 11:30 AM I WAS TRAVELING ON THE HIGHWAY (FLORIDA TURNPIKE NORTH) AT AROUND 70 MPH WITH MY WIFE AND CHILD, AND SUDDENLY THE BRAKES STOPPED RESPONDING ON MY LAND ROVER EVOQUE. THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS HARD AND COULD NOT BE PRESSED, IT WOULD NOT RESPOND. WE WERE ABLE TO LOSE SPEED, MERGE TO THE RIGHT OF THE HIGHWAY, AND COME TO A STOP ON THE SHOULDER. NEITHER BEFORE, DURING NOR AFTER THE EVENT, HAD ANY WARNING LIGHTS SHOWING ON THE VEHICLE'S DASHBOARD. WE CALLED OUR DEALER AND THEY SUGGESTED TO HAVE THE SUV TOWED TO THE NEAREST DEALER. WE HAD THE SUV TOWED WITH AAA TO THE DEALER. THE DEALER'S MANAGER DID NOT SEEM WORRIED OR SHOCKED AT THE TERRIFYING EVENT MY FAMILY AND I HAD JUST EXPERIENCED. IN FACT, HE DID NOT EVEN OFFER AN APOLOGY. DID NOT PROVIDE A LOANER OR RENTAL VEHICLE. VEHICLE WAS LEFT FOR THE SERVICE DEPARTMENT TO LOOK AT ON MONDAY. MY FATHER HAD TO DRIVE 211 MILES TO PICK US UP FROM THE DEALER AND DRIVE US BACK. MONDAY THE ANALYSIS CAME BACK AS A TEXT THAT READ: 'THE VACUUM PUMP SEIZED UP AND BROKE ONE OF THE INTAKE CAMSHAFTS. TO FIX THIS WE HAVE TO REMOVE THE TOP PART OF THE ENGINE AND REPLACE ALL PUMP, CAMSHAFT, TIMING GUIDE AND TENSIONER AND ALL THE ONE TIME USE GASKETS AND SEALS. THIS IS A LENGTHY JOB. TO DO THESE REPAIRS WOULD BE $5,532.10+TAX.' (ATTACHED IS THE EMAILED QUOTE WE REQUESTED) WE HAVE PHOTOS, VIDEOS, EMAILS, DOCUMENTS, AND TEXT MESSAGES EVIDENCE OF THE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED.
NHTSA ODI #11083348
47,370 miles · May 18, 2017
Service Brakes
TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2012 LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER. WHILE DRIVING 30 MPH, THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS APPLIED, BUT THE VEHICLE FAILED TO RESPOND. THE FAILURE OCCURRED WITHOUT WARNING. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT DIAGNOSED OR REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 47,370.
NHTSA ODI #10986358
NHTSA investigations
4EA21002 · Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture
Opened Sep 17, 2021 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module; Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
EA20001 · Loss Of Brake Power Assist
Opened Aug 31, 2020 · Closed Feb 27, 2023
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Service Brakes; Service Brakes, Hydraulic:power Assist:vacuum
On August 31, 2020, ODI upgraded PE18-014 to Engineering Analysis (EA)20-001 to continue its investigation of brake vacuum pump failures in model year (MY) 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles and peer Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) products equipped with 2.0L GTDI engines fitted with Magna vacuum pumps. This investigative activity has focused on the cause, scope, and effect of inadequate vacuum supply at the vehicles brake booster with its attendant increases of brake pedal effort and diminished braking performance. Following a detailed analysis of data collected, the alleged defect is progressive and reasonably detectable with adequate power braking assist available prior to complete pump failure; occurs at marginal failure rates, particularly where the vehicle age is considered; and the complaint trend dissipated to one occurrence per year over the last three calendar years.Based on the analysis conducted, this investigation has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists, based upon additional information the Agency may receive. For a detailed summary of the investigation see attached closing resume document.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at: http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID using the following complaint identification numbers: 10986358, 11025409, 11083348, 11131896, 11149724, 11231234, 11343256, 11425440, 11485127.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Service Brakes, Hydraulic:power Assist:vacuum
On August 31, 2020, ODI upgraded PE18-014 to Engineering Analysis (EA)20-001 to continue its investigation of brake vacuum pump failures in model year (MY) 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles and peer Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) products equipped with 2.0L GTDI engines fitted with Magna vacuum pumps. This investigative activity has focused on the cause, scope, and effect of inadequate vacuum supply at the vehicles brake booster with its attendant increases of brake pedal effort and diminished braking performance. Following a detailed analysis of data collected, the alleged defect is progressive and reasonably detectable with adequate power braking assist available prior to complete pump failure; occurs at marginal failure rates, particularly where the vehicle age is considered; and the complaint trend dissipated to one occurrence per year over the last three calendar years.Based on the analysis conducted, this investigation has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists, based upon additional information the Agency may receive. For a detailed summary of the investigation see attached closing resume document.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at: http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID using the following complaint identification numbers: 10986358, 11025409, 11083348, 11131896, 11149724, 11231234, 11343256, 11425440, 11485127.
Service Brakes
On August 31, 2020, ODI upgraded PE18-014 to Engineering Analysis (EA)20-001 to continue its investigation of brake vacuum pump failures in model year (MY) 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles and peer Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) products equipped with 2.0L GTDI engines fitted with Magna vacuum pumps. This investigative activity has focused on the cause, scope, and effect of inadequate vacuum supply at the vehicles brake booster with its attendant increases of brake pedal effort and diminished braking performance. Following a detailed analysis of data collected, the alleged defect is progressive and reasonably detectable with adequate power braking assist available prior to complete pump failure; occurs at marginal failure rates, particularly where the vehicle age is considered; and the complaint trend dissipated to one occurrence per year over the last three calendar years.Based on the analysis conducted, this investigation has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists, based upon additional information the Agency may receive. For a detailed summary of the investigation see attached closing resume document.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at: http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID using the following complaint identification numbers: 10986358, 11025409, 11083348, 11131896, 11149724, 11231234, 11343256, 11425440, 11485127.
PE18014 · Loss Of Brake Power Assist
Opened Dec 1, 2018 · Closed Sep 10, 2020
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Service Brakes; Service Brakes, Hydraulic:power Assist:vacuum; Service Brakes, Hydraulic:power Assist:vacuum:hoses, Lines/piping, And Fittings
On December 1, 2018, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE18-014 to investigate allegations of brake vacuum pump failure in model year (MY) 2012 through 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. During PE18-014, ODI identified 33 complaints and field reports related to the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Seven of the complaints were received by ODI and 26 were reported as consumer complaints or field reports in the Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) response to ODI's Information Request letter for PE18-014. All the complaints and field reports identified by ODI involved MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. ODI's analysis of warranty data supplied by JLR identified 198 claims related to the alleged defect in MY 2012-2013 vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of 0.84 percent. ODI identified just 6 claims in the MY 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of0.09 percent.The subject vehicles are equipped with 2.0 liter Gasoline Turbocharged Direct Injection (GTDI) engines that utilize a mechanically driven single vane rotary vacuum pump supplied by Magna International (Magna). The 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps were used by JLR in the following applications: MY 2012-2017 Land Rover Range Rover Evoque (L538), MY 2013-2015 Land Rover LR2 (L359), MY 2015-2017 Land Rover Discovery Sport (L550), MY 2013-2015 Jaguar XF (X250), and MY 2017 Jaguar XE (X760). Field return analyses of failed vacuum pumps from these products has determined that the failures were caused by blockage of the orifice supplying lubricating oil to the pump. Magna and JLR have attributed the blockage to oil sludge resulting from failure to perform oil changes at the specified maintenance intervals.This Preliminary Evaluation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA20-001) covering MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles (subject vehicles). Other JLR products equipped with 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps will be included in the EA as peer vehicles. The EA will further assess the causes of pump failures in the subject and peer vehicles, the frequency and trends of pump failures in each population, the reasons for differences in experience between subject and peer vehicle applications, and the effects of pump failure on brake system performance in the subject vehicles.The ODI reports (VOQs) cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under the following reference numbers: 10986358, 11025409, 11083348, 11131896, 11149724, 11231234, 11343256.
Additional source detail variants (3)
Service Brakes, Hydraulic:power Assist:vacuum:hoses, Lines/piping, And Fittings
On December 1, 2018, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE18-014 to investigate allegations of brake vacuum pump failure in model year (MY) 2012 through 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. During PE18-014, ODI identified 33 complaints and field reports related to the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Seven of the complaints were received by ODI and 26 were reported as consumer complaints or field reports in the Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) response to ODI's Information Request letter for PE18-014. All the complaints and field reports identified by ODI involved MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. ODI's analysis of warranty data supplied by JLR identified 198 claims related to the alleged defect in MY 2012-2013 vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of 0.84 percent. ODI identified just 6 claims in the MY 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of0.09 percent.The subject vehicles are equipped with 2.0 liter Gasoline Turbocharged Direct Injection (GTDI) engines that utilize a mechanically driven single vane rotary vacuum pump supplied by Magna International (Magna). The 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps were used by JLR in the following applications: MY 2012-2017 Land Rover Range Rover Evoque (L538), MY 2013-2015 Land Rover LR2 (L359), MY 2015-2017 Land Rover Discovery Sport (L550), MY 2013-2015 Jaguar XF (X250), and MY 2017 Jaguar XE (X760). Field return analyses of failed vacuum pumps from these products has determined that the failures were caused by blockage of the orifice supplying lubricating oil to the pump. Magna and JLR have attributed the blockage to oil sludge resulting from failure to perform oil changes at the specified maintenance intervals.This Preliminary Evaluation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA20-001) covering MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles (subject vehicles). Other JLR products equipped with 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps will be included in the EA as peer vehicles. The EA will further assess the causes of pump failures in the subject and peer vehicles, the frequency and trends of pump failures in each population, the reasons for differences in experience between subject and peer vehicle applications, and the effects of pump failure on brake system performance in the subject vehicles.The ODI reports (VOQs) cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under the following reference numbers: 10986358, 11025409, 11083348, 11131896, 11149724, 11231234, 11343256.
Service Brakes, Hydraulic:power Assist:vacuum
On December 1, 2018, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE18-014 to investigate allegations of brake vacuum pump failure in model year (MY) 2012 through 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. During PE18-014, ODI identified 33 complaints and field reports related to the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Seven of the complaints were received by ODI and 26 were reported as consumer complaints or field reports in the Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) response to ODI's Information Request letter for PE18-014. All the complaints and field reports identified by ODI involved MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. ODI's analysis of warranty data supplied by JLR identified 198 claims related to the alleged defect in MY 2012-2013 vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of 0.84 percent. ODI identified just 6 claims in the MY 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of0.09 percent.The subject vehicles are equipped with 2.0 liter Gasoline Turbocharged Direct Injection (GTDI) engines that utilize a mechanically driven single vane rotary vacuum pump supplied by Magna International (Magna). The 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps were used by JLR in the following applications: MY 2012-2017 Land Rover Range Rover Evoque (L538), MY 2013-2015 Land Rover LR2 (L359), MY 2015-2017 Land Rover Discovery Sport (L550), MY 2013-2015 Jaguar XF (X250), and MY 2017 Jaguar XE (X760). Field return analyses of failed vacuum pumps from these products has determined that the failures were caused by blockage of the orifice supplying lubricating oil to the pump. Magna and JLR have attributed the blockage to oil sludge resulting from failure to perform oil changes at the specified maintenance intervals.This Preliminary Evaluation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA20-001) covering MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles (subject vehicles). Other JLR products equipped with 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps will be included in the EA as peer vehicles. The EA will further assess the causes of pump failures in the subject and peer vehicles, the frequency and trends of pump failures in each population, the reasons for differences in experience between subject and peer vehicle applications, and the effects of pump failure on brake system performance in the subject vehicles.The ODI reports (VOQs) cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under the following reference numbers: 10986358, 11025409, 11083348, 11131896, 11149724, 11231234, 11343256.
Service Brakes
On December 1, 2018, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE18-014 to investigate allegations of brake vacuum pump failure in model year (MY) 2012 through 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. During PE18-014, ODI identified 33 complaints and field reports related to the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Seven of the complaints were received by ODI and 26 were reported as consumer complaints or field reports in the Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) response to ODI's Information Request letter for PE18-014. All the complaints and field reports identified by ODI involved MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles. ODI's analysis of warranty data supplied by JLR identified 198 claims related to the alleged defect in MY 2012-2013 vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of 0.84 percent. ODI identified just 6 claims in the MY 2014 Range Rover Evoque vehicles, resulting in a claim rate of0.09 percent.The subject vehicles are equipped with 2.0 liter Gasoline Turbocharged Direct Injection (GTDI) engines that utilize a mechanically driven single vane rotary vacuum pump supplied by Magna International (Magna). The 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps were used by JLR in the following applications: MY 2012-2017 Land Rover Range Rover Evoque (L538), MY 2013-2015 Land Rover LR2 (L359), MY 2015-2017 Land Rover Discovery Sport (L550), MY 2013-2015 Jaguar XF (X250), and MY 2017 Jaguar XE (X760). Field return analyses of failed vacuum pumps from these products has determined that the failures were caused by blockage of the orifice supplying lubricating oil to the pump. Magna and JLR have attributed the blockage to oil sludge resulting from failure to perform oil changes at the specified maintenance intervals.This Preliminary Evaluation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA20-001) covering MY 2012-2013 Range Rover Evoque vehicles (subject vehicles). Other JLR products equipped with 2.0L GTDI engines and subject Magna vacuum pumps will be included in the EA as peer vehicles. The EA will further assess the causes of pump failures in the subject and peer vehicles, the frequency and trends of pump failures in each population, the reasons for differences in experience between subject and peer vehicle applications, and the effects of pump failure on brake system performance in the subject vehicles.The ODI reports (VOQs) cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under the following reference numbers: 10986358, 11025409, 11083348, 11131896, 11149724, 11231234, 11343256.
PE16015 · Powered Vehicle Rollaway
Opened Dec 16, 2016 · Closed Aug 11, 2020
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Power Train:automatic Transmission
On December 16, 2016, ODI opened PE16-015 to investigate seven complaints alleging incidents of powered rollaway in model year (MY) 2012 through 2014 Land Rover/Range Rover Evoque and Jaguar XF vehicles. The complaints all alleged that the rollaway incidents occurred after the operators shifted to Park and exited the vehicle with the engine left running. All of the incidents alleged that crashes resulted from the unexpected vehicle movement and three alleged injuries. Two of the complaints counted in the opening resume (ID's 10760326 and 10884136) involved the same vehicle and incident. ODI has not received any new complaints since PE16-015 was opened, resulting in current ODI report totals of 6 incidents, 6 crashes and 3 injuries. Field data provided by Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in response to ODI's information request letter for PE16-015 included 10 allegations of powered rollaway incidents in the subject vehicles, including 9 alleging crashes. Updates provided by JLR through October 25, 2019, have identified one additional powered rollaway allegation in the subject vehicles. The new incident included a crash allegation, bringing the JLR field incident totals to 11 incidents and 10 crashes. None of the JLR reports allege injuries. Two of the JLR reports are duplicates of incidents reported to ODI, resulting in a total of 15 incidents, 14 crashes and 3 injury allegations in the subject vehicles. ODI's analysis of system design and field incident investigative data has not identified any mechanical or electronic faults that have caused subject vehicle transmissions to shift out of Park with no operator input nor has the analysis identified any faults that would result in a failure to execute a valid Park shift selection. JLR's field investigations of powered rollaway incidents have assessed the root cause to be operator error. Based on these assessments and the low rate and declining trend in rollaway incidents, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive. For more detailed information about field incident analysis for the subject and peer vehicles see the attached report.The ODI reports (VOQs) cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under the following reference numbers with duplicate records shown in parentheses: 10504853, 10548937, 10565212, 10631673, 10760326 (10884136), 10892346.
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